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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 14283

DAN L. KARTCHNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by Salt Lake County seeking a
mandatory injunction against appellant Dan L. Kartchner to
require him to remove a portion of a carport in violation of
the setback requirements of the zoning ordinances of Salt Lake
County and to require him to obtain a building permit for the
remaining portion of the carport.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was heard without a jury before the Honorable
James S. Sawaya, one of the judges of the Third District Court,
on July 16, 1975.

The court held for respondent Salt Lake County

and granted a mandatory injunction against appellant requiring
him to remove 6.5 feet of the carport which was found to be in
violation of the setback requirements of the zoning ordinances
of Salt Lake County.

The court also ordered that appellant
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obtain a building permit and pay a penalty fee for the remaining
portion of the carport.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Salt Lake County seeks affirmance of the
lower court's decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the spring of 1972, appellant began building a
carport on his residence at 10257 South 1280 East in Salt Lake
County.

R-86.

Appellant did not obtain a building permit for

the structure, although he testified that he knew one was
required under the law.

R-86.

Appellant's property is located

in an R-l-8 zone which requires that carports be set back 30
feet from the front property line or the average of the existing buildings where 50 per cent or more of the frontage is
developed.

R-73. Appellant was required to set back his

carport 26 feet from the street, which was the average setback
of the houses on appellant's street.

R-74. Appellant's carport

was set back only 20 feet. R-71.
On May 22, 1972, Lamar Williams, a County building
enforcement inspector, noticed the construction at appellant's
residence and, as appellant was not home, left a notice at the
residence stating that appellant would have to obtain a building
permit for the structure.
project was just beginning.

Exhibit P-l, R-60.

At that time, the

R-62. Again, on November 7, 1972,
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Mr. Williams returned to appellant's property and, as appellant
was not at home again, left a second notice at his home,
stating that appellant needed a building permit for the carport and that the carport would have to comply with the setback requirements of the zoning ordinance.
that he was 10 feet in violation.

The report noted

Exhibit P-2, R-62. The

project was well under way at that time.

R-62*

On February 20, 1973, Martin Dee Jeffs, a zoning
inspector for Salt Lake County, personally visited appellant at
his residence where he was putting the final touches on the
carport.

At that time, appellant admitted he had continued

working on the project in spite of the prior notices.

R-69.

On February 22, 1973, Mr. Jeffs mailed a notice to appellant
to stop work on the project and to remove the carport because
it was in violation of the setback requirements of the zoning
ordinance and that his variance had been denied by the Board of
Adjustment.

Exhibit P-3.

On March 7, 1973, Salt Lake County filed the captioned
action because appellant failed to comply with Mr. Jeffs'
order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
LACHES IS NOT A PROPER DEFENSE IN THIS CASE.
Appellant, in his brief, cites several cases for the
general proposition that laches may be an appropriate defense
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in a private action where there has been an unconscionable
delay in seeking relief.

None of these cases involve an action

by a municipality to enjoin violation of its laws because the
rule does not apply in such cases.

This exception to the

doctrine of laches is stated in 3 Anderson, American Law of
Zoning, Section 23.15, p. 651:
"Delay which might forfeit a private
person's right to have a zoning violation enjoined does not affect a similar
right in a municipality. Thus, a municipality may maintain an action to enjoin
violation of the zoning ordinance although
the violation has existed for more than 20
years without any objection being expressed
by municipal officials."
The courts have consistently held that the doctrine of
laches has no application to the enforcement of zoning ordinances
by a municipality.

Fabini v. Kemmerer Realty Co., 175 N.Y.2d

964 (N.Y. 1958); Everett v. Capitol Motor Transportation Co.,
114 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1953); Lincoln v. Giles, 57 N.E.2d 554
(Mass. 1944); Pallman v. East Haven, 67 A.2d 560 (Conn. 1949);
Bianco v. Town of Darien, 254 A.2d 898 (Conn. 1969), citing
numerous other cases.
In Lincoln v. Giles, supra, the court rejected the
contention that a delay of a building inspector in proceeding
against the defendant therein after he began the illegal use of
his property barred the municipality from proceeding against
the defendant.

The court stated:

"The delay of the building inspector, if
there was a delay, in proceeding against
the defendant after he began to use his
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premises for a purpose not permitted by
the by-law does not bar the town from
enforcing the by-law. The plaintiff town
brings this bill not to enforce some
private or proprietary right but as a
governmental agency to protect the public
interest; and if, as the defendant urges,
but which we do not decide, there was delay
by a public official in bringing proceedings
against him, that delay cannot be imputed to
the plaintiff." 57 N.E.2d at 555.
In any event, the lower court found that the evidence
did not establish the defense of laches, which finding is
supported by the record.

Each time the County contacted the

appellant, he was notified that he was in violation of the law.
Never did any County official acquiesce in the illegal building
of the carports

Appellant's apparent position that the County

has to immediately catch and stop him from violating the zoning
ordinance in order to have a right to enforce its laws is untenable.

The action was instigated within a year from the date

appellant began the project after County employees gave appellant
numerous opportunities to correct the problem.
POINT II
THE COUNTY IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM ENFORCING ITS ZONING ORDINANCE
BECAUSE THERE MAY BE INSTANCES WHERE THE ZONING ORDINANCE HAS
NOT BEEN ENFORCED.
Appellant, in his brief, contends that the County
may not enforce its zoning ordinance against appellant because
there may be other instances of violations in the neighborhood
which have not been enforced by the County.

This position was
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rejected by this court in State v. Starlite Cluby 17 U.2d 174,
406 P.2d 912 (1969), where the court, through Justice Henroid,
stated in rejecting the defense, that the State of Utah was
estopped from bringing an action against the defendant therein
for liquor violations because of other alleged violations
which had not been prosecuted:
"We think such a conclusion is a nonsequetor that could lead to rather
startling results requiring, for
example, that a convicted burglar
could demand release since many
other burglars have not been prosecuted
and convicted or had been treated not
exactly the same."
In the area of zoning, the courts have also consistently held that a failure to comply with a zoning ordinance
cannot be justified because of the existence of violations of
other persons.

Kansas City v. Wilhoit, 237 S.W.2d 919

(Mo. App. 1951); Lee v. Wichita, 83 P.2d 644 (Kan. 1938);
State v. Caine, 242 P.2d 505 (Wash. 1952); and State v. Martin,
171 S.E.2d 115 (N.C. 1969).
Similar to the problem of police officers attempting to enforce traffic violations, zoning enforcement inspectors do not have the manpower to bring an action against every
possible zoning violator.

In fact, it is difficult to enforce

even current violations.

Long existing violations are difficult

to establish because of stale facts and non-conforming uses.
In addition, the person responsible for the violation may not
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be the current owner.

This was not the case here where the

property owner was repeatedly warned by County officials that
he was violating a law and proceeded to build the carport in
violation of the law anyway*
POINT III
INJUNCTION IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE REMEDY IN THIS CASE TO
CORRECT THE UNLAWFUL SITUATION.
As appellant acknowledges in his brief, Utah Code
Annotated 17-27-23 specifically grants to the County Attorney
the right to instigate injunction actions to remove an unlawful
construction.

None of the cases cited by appellant discussing

injunction are relevant as they involve private actions and not
a statutory right granted to a municipality.

For the County to

bring a criminal action against appellant where he would likely
be fined would not correct the illegal situation.

The only

appropriate remedy by the County which will rectify the unlawful
situation intentionally created by appellant is an injunction.
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT APPELLANT IS IN VIOLATION OF
SECTION 22-16-7 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY.
Section 22-16-7 provides as follows:
"The minimum depth of a front yard . . .
for private garages which shall have a
minimum side yard of eight feet shall
be 30 feet or the average of the existing
buildings where 50 per cent or more of
the frontage is developed . . . ."
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Mr. Jeffs testified that appellant1s carport is 20
feet from his front property line and the average frontage
for the houses on the street is 26 feet.

Corner lots were

excluded from the measurement because they may front on either
street they abut as long as they have a 30-foot setback on the
side of the house considered as the front yard and a 20-foot
setback on the side considered as the side yard.

R-87.

Mr. Jeffs testified that the setbacks for the corner lots complied with the ordinance requirement which means that the
corner lots have a 30-foot setback on the street appellant's
house fronts on, or that they have a 30-foot setback on the
adjoining street, in which case they are not considered as
fronting on appellant's street. Thus, measuring the corner
lots, if they did front on the same street as appellant's house,
could only have made the 26 foot figure greater.

In any event,

no objection was made to Mr. Jeffs' testimony at trial.
CONCLUSION
Setback requirements play an important function in
a zoning plan and their validity has been approved by numerous
courts, including this Court.
280 P.2d 974 (1955).

Hargraves v. Young, 3 U.2d 175,

Appellant's position that he should not

have to comply with County setback requirements because it
would be a hardship for him to do so fails to take into account
the fact that the hardship is a self-created one caused by
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his intentional disregard of the law.

In essence, appellant

is attempting to turn his disregard of the law to his advantage.
If this Court were to sustain such a position, it would encourage
others to build in violation of the law and then claim the
structure should not be removed because it would create a
hardship to do so.

For this reason and the reasons heretofore

enumerated, respondent Salt Lake County prays that the decision
of the lower court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Salt Lake County Attorney
DONALD SAWAYA
Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney
KENT S. LEWIS
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
Salt Lake County
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